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The Hidden Vulnerabilities of Open Source - Revisiting and Contextualizing the designed xz backdoor, multi-year-long effort (fastcode.io)

submitted 2 weeks ago by Kissaki@programming.dev to c/programming@programming.dev

7 comments fedilink hide all child comments

cross-posted from: https://programming.dev/post/36983916

Freund wasn’t looking for a backdoor when he noticed SSH connections to his Debian testing system taking 500 milliseconds longer than usual. As a database engineer benchmarking PostgreSQL performance, he initially dismissed the anomaly. But the engineer’s curiosity persisted.

The backdoor’s technical sophistication was breathtaking. Hidden across multiple stages, from modified build scripts that only activated under specific conditions to obfuscated binary payloads concealed in test files, the attack hijacked SSH authentication through an intricate chain of library dependencies. When triggered, it would grant the attacker complete remote access to any targeted system, bypassing all authentication and leaving no trace in logs.

The backdoored versions 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 had been released in February and March 2024, infiltrating development versions of Fedora, Debian, openSUSE, and Arch Linux. Ubuntu’s upcoming 24.04 LTS release, which would have deployed to millions of production systems, was mere weeks away.

The technical backdoor was merely the final act of a three-year psychological operation that began not with code, but with studying a vulnerable human being.

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[–] stsquad@lemmy.ml 9 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

There are large areas of open source that don't rely on volunteer labour because companies with a vested interest pay people to work on them. They tend to be the obvious large projects that are continuously developed and gain new features. The trouble with something like xz is it was mostly "done" (as in it did the thing it was intended to do) but still needed maintenance to address the minor niggles, bug reports and updates to tooling and dependencies.

The foundations could do a better job here of supporting the maintainers. After Heartbleed the Linux Foundation started the Core Infrastructure Initiative to help fund those under recognised projects. I would hope the people running that could be more proactive identifying those critical understaffed components.

Edit I think it's now called the Open Source Security Foundation: https://openssf.org/