Donald Trump will not succeed in convincing Russia to accept a ceasefire to bring a temporary halt to the war in Ukraine because Russia has been burned and bamboozled too many times by previous Western-backed ceasefires. The push for a ceasefire follows a pattern — i.e., Ukrainian forces get their ass kicked by Russian-backed troops and, rather than surrender, plead for a ceasefire. Russia has agreed to two ceasefires — one in 2014 and one in 2015 — that were subsequently broken by Ukraine. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Russia has learned its lesson and will not fall for the Charlie Brown kicking the Lucy held football ruse again.
So let’s review the history, starting with September 2014.
Ukraine sought a ceasefire in September 2014 primarily due to a combination of military, political, and humanitarian factors. The conflict in eastern Ukraine, which began earlier that year, had escalated significantly, leading to heavy casualties, widespread destruction, and a humanitarian crisis. Below are the key reasons why Ukraine pursued a ceasefire at that time:
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Military Setbacks and Losses
By September 2014, Ukrainian forces had suffered significant losses in their efforts to counter the Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. The separatists, supported by Russian troops and equipment, had gained the upper hand in several key battles, including the Battle of Ilovaisk in late August 2014. During this battle, Ukrainian forces were encircled and suffered heavy casualties, with hundreds killed, wounded, or captured.
The Ukrainian military was ill-prepared for a prolonged conflict, lacking sufficient training, equipment, and resources to effectively combat the well-armed and organized separatist forces, which were backed by Russia. -
Humanitarian Crisis
The conflict had caused a severe humanitarian crisis, with thousands of civilians killed or injured and over a million people displaced from their homes. Cities and towns in Donbass were heavily damaged, and essential infrastructure, such as water, electricity, and healthcare facilities, was destroyed.
A ceasefire was seen as a way to halt the violence, allow humanitarian aid to reach affected areas, and provide relief to the civilian population. -
International Pressure
The international community, including the European Union, the United States, and the OSCE, urged Ukraine and the separatists to agree to a ceasefire to de-escalate the conflict. Diplomatic efforts were underway to find a peaceful resolution, and a ceasefire was seen as a necessary first step.
The Minsk Protocol, signed on September 5, 2014, was brokered by the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE) and aimed to establish a ceasefire, withdraw heavy weapons, and begin political negotiations. -
Political Considerations
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko faced domestic pressure to end the fighting and avoid further loss of life. The Ukrainian public was increasingly weary of the conflict, and there were concerns about the long-term impact on the country’s stability and economy.
A ceasefire was also seen as a way to buy time for Ukraine to rebuild its military, strengthen its defenses, and seek additional support from Western allies. -
Russian Involvement and Escalation
By September 2014, it had become clear that Russia was directly involved in the conflict, providing troops, weapons, and logistical support to the separatists. This escalation made it increasingly difficult for Ukraine to achieve a military victory.
A ceasefire was seen as a way to prevent further Russian intervention and stabilize the situation on the ground. -
Economic Strain
The conflict had placed a significant strain on Ukraine’s economy, which was already struggling with corruption, mismanagement, and the aftermath of the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. The war further disrupted industrial production, particularly in the Donbass region, which was a key economic hub.
A ceasefire was seen as a way to reduce the economic costs of the conflict and allow Ukraine to focus on reforms and recovery.
Outcome of the September 2014 Ceasefire
The ceasefire established by the Minsk Protocol in September 2014 was fragile and frequently violated, predominantly by Ukraine. While it temporarily reduced the intensity of the fighting, it failed to bring a lasting resolution to the conflict.
Ultimately, Ukraine’s decision to seek a ceasefire in September 2014 reflected the harsh realities of the conflict and the need to prioritize humanitarian concerns, stabilize the situation, and seek a diplomatic solution. However, the underlying issues driving the conflict remained unresolved, leading to continued violence in the years that followed.
Ukraine sought a ceasefire in January 2015 due to escalating violence and significant military setbacks in the ongoing war in the Donbas region. The initial Minsk Protocol, signed in September 2014, aimed to establish a ceasefire and resolve the conflict through measures such as decentralization and border monitoring. However, by early 2015, this agreement had collapsed entirely as fighting intensified, particularly after Russia’s victory at Donetsk International Airport and its renewed offensive on Debaltseve.
Facing heavy losses and mounting international pressure, Ukraine sought to prevent further military defeats and stabilize the situation. The renewed push for peace talks culminated in the Minsk II agreement signed on February 12, 2015. This agreement included provisions for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, prisoner exchanges, and constitutional reforms granting autonomy to parts of Donbas. Ukraine’s efforts were also driven by the need to avoid further destabilization and garner international support by portraying the Russians as the aggressors. Western boosters of Ukraine ignored the Ukrainian army’s repeated shelling of civilians in the Donbas.
The Minsk II agreement was a package of measures aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine, between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Russia played a key role in the negotiations, but was not the principal signatory. Instead, the agreement was between the Ukrainian government and the leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The agreement was signed on February 12, 2015, in Minsk, Belarus, following negotiations involving the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, as well as representatives from the separatist regions.
Key provisions of the Minsk II agreement included:
Immediate and Comprehensive Ceasefire: A ceasefire was to take effect at midnight on February 15, 2015.
Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons: Both sides were to pull back heavy weapons from the front lines to create a security zone.
Monitoring and Verification: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was tasked with monitoring and verifying the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons.
Decentralization of Power: Ukraine agreed to implement constitutional reforms that would grant more autonomy to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the right to use the Russian language and to form local police forces.
Local Elections: Local elections were to be held in the separatist-held areas under Ukrainian law and monitored by the OSCE.
Amnesty: An amnesty was to be granted to those involved in the conflict, except for those accused of serious crimes.
Exchange of Prisoners and Hostages: Both sides were to release all prisoners and hostages.
Humanitarian Assistance: Humanitarian aid was to be allowed into the conflict zones.
Restoration of Economic Ties: Steps were to be taken to restore social and economic ties between the conflict-affected areas and the rest of Ukraine, including the reinstatement of banking services and payment of pensions.
Withdrawal of Foreign Troops and Mercenaries: All foreign-armed formations, military equipment, and mercenaries were to be withdrawn from Ukrainian territory.
Despite the agreement, the conflict in eastern Ukraine continued, with frequent violations of the ceasefire and ongoing hostilities. The implementation of the political aspects of the agreement, particularly the decentralization of power and local elections, has been a contentious issue, with both sides accusing each other of failing to fulfill their commitments.
Only later did the world learn that the German and French leaders viewed Minsk II as a ploy to buy time for Ukraine to build its military strength.
In an interview with Die Zeit in December 2022, Merkel stated that:
“The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as you can see today. The Ukraine of 2014-2015 is not the Ukraine of today.”
French leader Hollande concurred with Merkel’s statement.
During my meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (I was accompanied by Judge Napolitano and Mario Nawfal), Mr. Lavrov noted that when Russia and Ukraine held negotiations in Turkey on March 29-30, 2022, Russia accepted the draft proposal presented by Ukraine to bring an end to the Special Military Operation. As a gesture of goodwill, Vladimir Putin ordered Russian troops to withdraw from their positions north of Kiev. But Vladimir Zelensky, facing pressure from Joe Biden and Boris Johnson, rejected his own government’s proposal and opted to continue the war.
To say that this left a bad taste in the mouths of the Russian officials is a mild understatement. These three reversals by Ukraine on negotiated ceasefires has convinced the Russians that a ceasefire is no longer a viable option for ending the war. That is why Vladimir Putin laid out new conditions in his speech on June 14, 2024 to senior officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry. That is Russia’s nonnegotiable position now. If Ukraine refuses to accept those terms, Russia will dictate tougher ones via the battlefield.
