Collectivist

The sense of counter-intuitivity here seems mostly to be generated by the convoluted grammar of your summarising assessment, but this is just an example of bare recursivity, since you’re applying the language of the post to the post itself.

I don't think it's counter-intuitive and the post itself never mentioned 'epistemic luck'.

Perhaps it would be interesting if we were to pick out authentic Gettier cases which are also accusations of some kind

This seems easy enough to contstruct, just base an accusation on a Gettier case. So in the case of the stopped clock, say we had an appointment at 6:00 and due to my broken watch I think it’s 7:00, as it so happens it actually is 7:00. When I accuse you of being an hour late it is a "Gettier attack", it's a true accusation, but it isn’t based on knowledge because it is based on a Gettier case.

While the writer is wrong, the post itself is actually quite interesting and made me think more about epistemic luck. I think Zack does correctly point out cases where I would say rationalists got epistemically lucky, although his views on the matter seem entirely different. I think this quote is a good microcosm of this post:

The Times's insinuation that Scott Alexander is a racist like Charles Murray seems like a "Gettier attack": the charge is essentially correct, even though the evidence used to prosecute the charge before a jury of distracted New York Times readers is completely bogus.

A "Gettier attack" is a very interesting concept I will keep in my back pocket, but he clearly doesn't know what a Gettier problem is. With a Gettier case a belief is both true and justified, but still not knowledge because the usually solid justification fails unexpectedly. The classic example is looking at your watch and seeing it's 7:00, believing it's 7:00, and it actually is 7:00, but it isn't knowledge because the usually solid justification of "my watch tells the time" failed unexpectedly when your watch broke when it reached 7:00 the last time and has been stuck on 7:00 ever since. You got epistemically lucky.

So while this isn't a "Gettier attack" Zack did get at least a partial dose of epistemic luck. He believes it isn't justified and therefore a Gettier attack, but in fact, you need justification for a Gettier attack, and it is justified, so he got some epistemic luck writing about epistemic luck. This is what a good chunk of this post feels like.

I don't know, when I googled it this 80000 hours article is one of the first results. It seems reasonable at first glance but I haven't looked into it.

Wait they had Peter's arguments and sources before the debate? And they're blaming the format? Having your challenger's material before the debate, while they don't have yours is basically a guaranteed win. You have his material, take it with you to the debate and just prepare answers in advance so you don't lose $100K! Who gave these idiots a $100K?

The way this is categorized, this 18.2% is also about things like climate change and pandemics.

the data presented on that page is incredibly noisy

Yes, that's why I said it's "less comprehensive" and why I first gave the better 2019 source which also points in the same direction. If there is a better source, or really any source, for the majority claim I would be interested in seeing it.

Speaking of which,

AI charities (which is not equivalent to simulated humans, because it also includes climate change, nearterm AI problems, pandemics etc)

AI is to climate change as indoor smoking is to fire safety, nearterm AI problems is an incredibly vague and broad category and I would need someone to explain to me why they believe AI has anything to do with pandemics. Any answer I can think of would reflect poorly on the one holding such belief.

You misread, it's 18.2% for long term and AI charities [emphasis added]

The linked stats are already way out of date

Do you have a source for this 'majority' claim? I tried searching for more up to date data but this less comprehensive 2020 data is even more skewed towards Global development (62%) and animal welfare (27.3%) with 18.2% for long term and AI charities (which is not equivalent to simulated humans, because it also includes climate change, nearterm AI problems, pandemics etc). Utility of existential risk reduction is basically always based on population growth/ future generations (aka humans) and not simulations. 'digital person' only has 25 posts on the EA forum (by comparison, global health and development has 2097 post). It seems unlikely to me that this is a majority belief.

I spend a lot of time campaigning for animal rights. These criticisms also apply to it but I don't consider it a strong argument there. EA's spend an estimated 1.8 million dollar per year (less than 1%, so nowhere near a majority) on "other longterm" which presumably includes simulated humans, but an estimated 55 million dollar per year (or 13%) on farmed animal welfare (for those who are curious, the largest recipient is global health at 44%, but it's important to note that it seems like the more people are into EA the less they give to that compared to more longtermist causes). Farmed animals "don’t resent your condescension or complain that you are not politically correct, they don't need money, they don't bring cultural baggage..." yet that doesn't mean they aren't a worthy cause. This quote might serve as something members should keep in mind, but I don't think it works as an argument on its own.

I'm not that good at sneering. 'EA is when you make Fordlândia'? Idk, you found the original post and you're much better at it, it's better if you do it.

When he posted the finished video on youtube yesterday, there were some quite critical comments on youtube, the EA forum and even lesswrong. Unfortunately they got little to no upvotes while the video itself got enough karma to still be on the frontpage on both forums.

The actual video promoting charter cities got posted to the EA forum.

He solved the is-ought problem? How did he do that?

what ought to be (what is probable)

Hey guys I also solved the is-ought problem, first we start with is (what we should do)...