Article by Eric Gujer for the NZZ. The linked original is in German; here follows a machine translation.
As in the Cold War, Russia is a threat. Just like back then, Americans and Europeans are arguing about the right way to deal with Moscow because their strategic interests are different.
It was a sad low point in American statesmanship when Trump and his vice president Vance pressed the Ukrainian president so hard that he lost his composure.
Then it took a while for Zelensky to put aside his thoughtless self-righteousness and signal his willingness to reach an understanding. Zelensky was the right man to wage war. But is he also suitable for making peace?
The testosterone show in the White House made everyone involved look bad. But the clash of three oversized egos is one thing. The strategic interests of the USA are something else.
In two interviews with CNN and Breitbart, Secretary of State Rubio painted a more nuanced picture of US foreign policy. He insisted that the goal remains a rapid end to the war in Ukraine. The Europeans have no better alternative. They would hope that Putin would ask for peace after another year of war. "That means another year of killing, dying and destruction, and that's not a very convincing plan."
Does the EU really want the Ukraine negotiations to fail?
The allies rarely agree on the big issues, which has already been garnished with doomsday rhetoric. Today, EU foreign policy chief Kallas claims boldly that the free world needs a new leader and that can only be Europe. Outside the Brussels bubble, such EU jingoism convinces no one.
The end of NATO, the end of the transatlantic alliance: this should be left behind - just like the premature triumphal cries that the negotiations have failed. They haven't even really begun yet. But some Europeans seem to be almost longing for Trump's Ukraine diplomacy to fail.
It seems as if Americans and Europeans are playing out their differences from the Cold War once again, this time with the roles reversed. In the 1970s, the wind began to change in Washington. The policy of détente was suddenly out. The Europeans considered this a dangerous game with fire. They called President Reagan, who deliberately opted for confrontation with the Soviet Union, a madman. They compared him to Dr. Strangelove from the film of the same name, the mad scientist who plays with the atom bomb.
Now it is the Europeans who are advocating toughness towards Moscow, while Washington is seeking understanding. Today it is Trump who the European media dub the "Mad King" - in reference to the series "Game of Thrones". The European understanding of America is apparently exhausted in Hollywood clichés.
The spectacle of the European-American dispute is not so new, and Moscow is once again the cause. Then as now, Russia is a threat. A bitter dispute rages again and again about how to deal with the threat.
The diverging views are the result of a different geopolitical situation. During the Cold War, Europeans feared that their continent would become the battlefield of a limited nuclear war. For a long time, managing the conflict through detente seemed to be the best solution for Europe.
The USA, on the other hand, was primarily focused on the global conflict with Moscow - not only in Europe, but also in Afghanistan and the Middle East. And the longer it went on, the more they sensed the opportunity to finally defeat the Soviet Union on all fronts.
The curse of geopolitics has not changed, nor has geography. The Europeans are concentrating on Europe. They know that a Putin triumph in Ukraine will immediately endanger their security.
The Trump administration, on the other hand, sees the Great Game again. For them, China is the focus. Russia is secondary and only relevant to the extent that its dependence on Beijing makes its arch-rival China even stronger.
Secretary of State Rubio puts it bluntly: "The big story of the 21st century is the American-Chinese relationship. If Russia becomes the Chinese's permanent junior partner, America will be faced with two nuclear powers."
Both countries have large nuclear arsenals and armed forces. "They can exert their power worldwide." Rubio warns against "confrontation with China, hopefully not militarily," and criticizes the lack of awareness of the dangers. "In diplomacy, the maturity and reason to manage the problems between the major powers and to prevent war have been lost." The Americans are the doves and the Europeans are the hawks - what a topsy-turvy world.
Even before Trump's second term in office, it was clear that he thought in terms of the logic of the major powers. Their balance is more important to him than the fate of the smaller ones. For the new government, the Ukraine issue is a ceasefire and a solution that prevents a clash between the nuclear powers. That is not nice, it is even amoral, but it is realpolitik.
Europe is still important for America
The Trump team views Ukraine through the prism of the triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing and Moscow. In order to ease this relationship and at the same time reduce Chinese influence on Russia, America is prepared to compromise in Ukraine.
Today it is the Europeans who do not want to relax the situation because the threat to them increases the more concessions Trump makes to Putin in Eastern Europe. This fundamental geopolitical conflict between the transatlantic allies cannot be resolved.
During the Cold War, the Europeans finally swung to the American course. They supported NATO's double-track decision, although the stationing of Pershing missiles initially exacerbated the nuclear confrontation in Europe. A new generation around Gorbachev, however, understood that the Soviet Union would not win the arms race.
How will the Europeans behave this time?
There should no longer be any doubt about Trump's determination. It is obvious that his government is reviving realpolitik concepts from the 1980s. Reagan's security advisor Brzezinski had placed Eurasia at the center, i.e. the huge land mass from Europe through Russia to China.
Brzezinski approvingly quoted the British geographer Mackinder, who declared Eurasia to be the global "heartland" at the beginning of the 20th century: "Whoever rules the heartland controls the world island. Whoever rules the world island controls the world."
The security advisor wrote that it was crucial for America how it "manages Eurasia." Eurasia is the chessboard on which the battle for world domination is being fought.
The new US government is pursuing its own version of the heartland theory.
In this perspective, China and Russia are the Eurasian heartland that will also decide the fate of the world in the 21st century. In a different constellation, however, because China has long since replaced Russia as the dominant power.
Putin may indulge his post-Soviet fantasies and occupy eastern Ukraine for this purpose, because he knows that without control of Ukraine, Russia will never again be an empire. But that does not change the fact that Moscow is only a junior partner. Russia is no longer a primary threat to America. China, on the other hand, is growing militarily stronger every year.
Washington is therefore focusing on Beijing, but does not ignore Moscow as a pawn in the chess game.
The old geopolitical theory has a special point for the current debate. Mackinder wrote over a hundred years ago: "Whoever rules Eastern Europe controls the heartland." Brzezinski also noted that America must exert a decisive influence on Europe in order to dominate Eurasia.
Europe remains geopolitically important: regardless of whether Europeans spend two or four percent of their economic output on defense; regardless of whether Europeans kowtow fervently enough to the imperial throne in Washington.
Does Trump see that he needs Europe to keep China in check and to free Russia from its dependence on China?
If the USA withdraws from Europe, stops aiding Ukraine and relocates its troops stationed in Poland or Romania, then it will weaken itself. If Europe does not defuse the conflict of interests with America and accept American leadership, then it will lose. These simple truths had a hard time during the Cold War, and yet in the end reason prevailed. That should be possible today too.
