Hotznplotzn

Vor dem Krieg waren sie Marketing-Unternehmer, Techno-DJs oder IT-Spezialisten. Nun fliegen sie Drohnen, um ihr Land vor den russischen Truppen zu verteidigen. Ukrainische Drohnen-Piloten wie die der Einheit „Yasni Ochi“ („Klare Augen“) gehören mittlerweile zu den effektivsten Soldaten auf dem Schlachtfeld. Wer sind diese Männer und was treibt sie an?

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38525488

Op-ed by Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East London.

[...]

Traditionally, Tibetan leaders and aides seek a young boy who is seen as the chosen reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. It is possible that after they do this, this time Beijing will try to appoint a rival figure.

However, the current Dalai Lama, who lives in exile in India, insists that the process of succession will be led by the Swiss-based Gaden Phodrang Trust, which manages his affairs. He said no one else had authority “to interfere in this matter” and that statement is being seen as a strong signal to China.

[...]

Beijing sees having more power over the selection of the Dalai Lama as an opportunity to stamp more authority on Tibet. Tibet’s strategic position and its resources are extremely valuable to China, and play a part in Beijing’s wider plans for regional dominance, and in its aim of pushing back against India, its powerful rival in south Asia.

Tibet provides China with a naturally defensive border with the rest of southern Asia, with its mountainous terrain providing a buffer against India. The brief Sino-Indian war of 1962 when the two countries battled for control of the region, still has implications for India and China today, where they continue to dispute border lands.

[...]

Tibet’s importance to Beijing also comes from its vast water resources. Access to more water is seen as increasingly important for China’s wider push towards self-sufficiency which has become imperative in the face of climate change. This also provides China with a significant geopolitical tool.

For instance, the Mekong River rises in Tibet and flows through China and along the borders of Myanamar and Laos and onward into Thailand and Cambodia. It is the third longest river in Asia, and is crucial for many of the economies of south-east Asia. It is estimated to sustain 60 million people.

China’s attempts to control water supplies, particularly through the building of huge dams in Tibet, has added to regional tensions. Around 50% of the flow to the Mekong was cut off for part of 2021, after a Chinese mega dam was built. This caused a lot of resentment from other countries which depended on the water.

[...]

Op-ed by Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East London.

[...]

Traditionally, Tibetan leaders and aides seek a young boy who is seen as the chosen reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. It is possible that after they do this, this time Beijing will try to appoint a rival figure.

However, the current Dalai Lama, who lives in exile in India, insists that the process of succession will be led by the Swiss-based Gaden Phodrang Trust, which manages his affairs. He said no one else had authority “to interfere in this matter” and that statement is being seen as a strong signal to China.

[...]

Beijing sees having more power over the selection of the Dalai Lama as an opportunity to stamp more authority on Tibet. Tibet’s strategic position and its resources are extremely valuable to China, and play a part in Beijing’s wider plans for regional dominance, and in its aim of pushing back against India, its powerful rival in south Asia.

Tibet provides China with a naturally defensive border with the rest of southern Asia, with its mountainous terrain providing a buffer against India. The brief Sino-Indian war of 1962 when the two countries battled for control of the region, still has implications for India and China today, where they continue to dispute border lands.

[...]

Tibet’s importance to Beijing also comes from its vast water resources. Access to more water is seen as increasingly important for China’s wider push towards self-sufficiency which has become imperative in the face of climate change. This also provides China with a significant geopolitical tool.

For instance, the Mekong River rises in Tibet and flows through China and along the borders of Myanamar and Laos and onward into Thailand and Cambodia. It is the third longest river in Asia, and is crucial for many of the economies of south-east Asia. It is estimated to sustain 60 million people.

China’s attempts to control water supplies, particularly through the building of huge dams in Tibet, has added to regional tensions. Around 50% of the flow to the Mekong was cut off for part of 2021, after a Chinese mega dam was built. This caused a lot of resentment from other countries which depended on the water.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38525433

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38525431

Archived

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on Tuesday claimed that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.

Mishustin credited the ramped-up manufacturing to greater state financial support for producers and innovators, including civilian companies.

Analysts from the Washington-based think tank, Institute for the Study of War, assessed that increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia’s growing nightly strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. It has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Shahed-like drones into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions, ISW reported.

The think tank specified that Russian forces are “continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions, and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.”

[...]

Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight said on Tuesday that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.

[...]

One electronic and radio warfare expert cited by ISW, Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on Tuesday that Ukrainian forces had observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on radio modems installed on Russian “Gerber” drones.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38525431

Archived

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on Tuesday claimed that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.

Mishustin credited the ramped-up manufacturing to greater state financial support for producers and innovators, including civilian companies.

Analysts from the Washington-based think tank, Institute for the Study of War, assessed that increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia’s growing nightly strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. It has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Shahed-like drones into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions, ISW reported.

The think tank specified that Russian forces are “continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions, and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.”

[...]

Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight said on Tuesday that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.

[...]

One electronic and radio warfare expert cited by ISW, Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on Tuesday that Ukrainian forces had observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on radio modems installed on Russian “Gerber” drones.

Archived

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on Tuesday claimed that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.

Mishustin credited the ramped-up manufacturing to greater state financial support for producers and innovators, including civilian companies.

Analysts from the Washington-based think tank, Institute for the Study of War, assessed that increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia’s growing nightly strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. It has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Shahed-like drones into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions, ISW reported.

The think tank specified that Russian forces are “continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions, and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.”

[...]

Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight said on Tuesday that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.

[...]

One electronic and radio warfare expert cited by ISW, Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on Tuesday that Ukrainian forces had observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on radio modems installed on Russian “Gerber” drones.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38491622

[...]

Many [Ukrainian] children were moved to Russian territories under the guise of vacation, education, or medical care. Some were placed in camps posing as integration programs, others were adopted into Russian families, stripped of their identities, and reissued new documents. In Russian schools, they’re banned from speaking Ukrainian, exposed to propaganda, and often recruited into the Youth Army.

This policy dates back to 2014, after Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but has intensified. Many of the children taken were not orphans, despite Russian claims. Most had living parents or relatives. Some were institutionalized, others were seized after parents were detained or separated.

[...]

Anatolii’s [not his real name] story is one of many such stories that fortunately ended with Save Ukraine being able to bring him back.

At 17, he was taken straight from school by Russian forces. A week before his 18th birthday, Anatolii was handed a conscription notice from the Russian army—with no real choice but to serve [...] Anatolii stayed behind in a southern Ukrainian town after his brother fled.

He became a target after he and his brother found two boxes of ammunition in a forest and threw them away. FSB agents later detained and beat him, demanding the weapons and names of Ukrainian soldiers. One day, they dragged him from the principal’s office, tied him up, put a bag over his head, and took him to be tortured.

“They broke my rib and shoulder joint, smashed my face, gave me lots of bruises… They said: ‘If we find anything on your phone—you won’t live.'”

At school, Anatolii was taught to shoot and handle explosives. Russians offered him trips to military camps, but he kept refusing.

[...]

In Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the Kremlin is waging a long-term campaign to erase Ukrainian identity and reshape the next generation into loyal subjects of the Russian state. Central to this effort is the militarization of children through schools, propaganda, and paramilitary training.

In classrooms, Ukrainian curricula are being replaced with Russian textbooks. The language, culture, and history of Ukraine are banned or distorted. Weekly indoctrination sessions known as “Conversations About the Important” push pro-Kremlin narratives and glorify military service. Children are taught to view Ukraine and the West as enemies.

[...]

Recruitment into these programs doesn’t focus on academic performance or discipline. Instead, students with aggressive behavior, bullying records, or emotional instability are often targeted, pointing to a disturbing strategy to raise a generation predisposed to violence and deeply indoctrinated with hostility toward NATO and the United States.

[...]

In 2016, Russia’s Defense Ministry launched a youth “military-patriotic” organization called Yunarmiya, or in English, Young Army. In reality, it’s a militarized movement that instills the ideology of Russian aggression and grooms future soldiers for the occupying regime.

Children as young as eight are enrolled. They’re made to swear an oath of loyalty to Russia, promise to “defend its interests,” and embrace “great patriotism.” After that, they undergo firearms and tactical training, learn to operate drones, and more.

Ashley Jordana, Hala Systems’ Director of Law, Policy and Human Rights, said Hala’s assessment, based on geolocation data from mobile phones traced to Yunarmiya bases and testimonies from survivors, suggests cadets are roused daily at 6 am. After a canteen breakfast of eggs and oatmeal, they attend classes in firearms assembly, mine clearance, and military tactics.

[...]

In Crimea, occupied since 2014, Russian authorities dismantled Ukrainian education and launched programs like The Train of Hope to assimilate children. The programme is a Russian state-run initiative launched in occupied Crimea that facilitates the adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Monuments to Russian weapons designers were erected on school grounds, and a 2014 doctrine officially linked education to military preparation.

[...]

Some of the children indoctrinated after 2014 are now dying on the battlefield, celebrated as heroes in Russian propaganda. One such case is 16-year-old Illia Moskvitin, a Youth Army member from occupied Donetsk, who was killed by a landmine in 2022. Others, like Ivan Shifman and Dmytro Kotov, joined Russian forces after years of ideological grooming.

[...]

• Dmytro Kotov: In 2015, he graduated from Gymnasium №6 in Dzhankoi, temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia later sent him to Yunarmiya, according to open-source data. After completing his studies at the Sevastopol State Technical University, Kotov signed a contract with the Russian military and served aboard the large landing ship Novocherkassk, part of the 197th Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. Dmytro died on March 24, 2022, while participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

• Illia Moskvitin was also a member of the Yunarmiya unit operating in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region. Illia died on April 14, 2022, before even reaching the age of 16, after stepping on a Lepestok anti-personnel mine, according to materials published by the Yunarmiya organization.

• Ivan Shifman, a student at School №1 in the city of Kalmiuske in the Donetsk region, joined Yunarmiya in 2019. After turning 18, he enlisted in the so-called “People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic” and began serving in Russia’s 1st Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ivan took part in combat operations in several towns across the Donetsk region, including Starohnativka, Hranitne, Malyi Yanisol, Zaitseve, and Rozivka. Ivan was killed in action near the village of Novobakhmutivka along the front line in Donetsk on April 14, 2022—the same day as Illia.

[...]

** What needs to be done to prevent it**

The evidence gathered in this article barely touches the surface of this issue, but it shows how Russia’s child abductions are a systemic state policy.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in the deportations, an act that constitutes a war crime under international law.

Both are suspected of committing the war crime of unlawfully deporting children from occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia—an operation the court says has been underway since at least February 24, 2022.

A historic moment in international law unfolded in Strasbourg on June 25, 2025, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset formally launched the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine, established in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38491622

[...]

Many [Ukrainian] children were moved to Russian territories under the guise of vacation, education, or medical care. Some were placed in camps posing as integration programs, others were adopted into Russian families, stripped of their identities, and reissued new documents. In Russian schools, they’re banned from speaking Ukrainian, exposed to propaganda, and often recruited into the Youth Army.

This policy dates back to 2014, after Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but has intensified. Many of the children taken were not orphans, despite Russian claims. Most had living parents or relatives. Some were institutionalized, others were seized after parents were detained or separated.

[...]

Anatolii’s [not his real name] story is one of many such stories that fortunately ended with Save Ukraine being able to bring him back.

At 17, he was taken straight from school by Russian forces. A week before his 18th birthday, Anatolii was handed a conscription notice from the Russian army—with no real choice but to serve [...] Anatolii stayed behind in a southern Ukrainian town after his brother fled.

He became a target after he and his brother found two boxes of ammunition in a forest and threw them away. FSB agents later detained and beat him, demanding the weapons and names of Ukrainian soldiers. One day, they dragged him from the principal’s office, tied him up, put a bag over his head, and took him to be tortured.

“They broke my rib and shoulder joint, smashed my face, gave me lots of bruises… They said: ‘If we find anything on your phone—you won’t live.'”

At school, Anatolii was taught to shoot and handle explosives. Russians offered him trips to military camps, but he kept refusing.

[...]

In Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the Kremlin is waging a long-term campaign to erase Ukrainian identity and reshape the next generation into loyal subjects of the Russian state. Central to this effort is the militarization of children through schools, propaganda, and paramilitary training.

In classrooms, Ukrainian curricula are being replaced with Russian textbooks. The language, culture, and history of Ukraine are banned or distorted. Weekly indoctrination sessions known as “Conversations About the Important” push pro-Kremlin narratives and glorify military service. Children are taught to view Ukraine and the West as enemies.

[...]

Recruitment into these programs doesn’t focus on academic performance or discipline. Instead, students with aggressive behavior, bullying records, or emotional instability are often targeted, pointing to a disturbing strategy to raise a generation predisposed to violence and deeply indoctrinated with hostility toward NATO and the United States.

[...]

In 2016, Russia’s Defense Ministry launched a youth “military-patriotic” organization called Yunarmiya, or in English, Young Army. In reality, it’s a militarized movement that instills the ideology of Russian aggression and grooms future soldiers for the occupying regime.

Children as young as eight are enrolled. They’re made to swear an oath of loyalty to Russia, promise to “defend its interests,” and embrace “great patriotism.” After that, they undergo firearms and tactical training, learn to operate drones, and more.

Ashley Jordana, Hala Systems’ Director of Law, Policy and Human Rights, said Hala’s assessment, based on geolocation data from mobile phones traced to Yunarmiya bases and testimonies from survivors, suggests cadets are roused daily at 6 am. After a canteen breakfast of eggs and oatmeal, they attend classes in firearms assembly, mine clearance, and military tactics.

[...]

In Crimea, occupied since 2014, Russian authorities dismantled Ukrainian education and launched programs like The Train of Hope to assimilate children. The programme is a Russian state-run initiative launched in occupied Crimea that facilitates the adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Monuments to Russian weapons designers were erected on school grounds, and a 2014 doctrine officially linked education to military preparation.

[...]

Some of the children indoctrinated after 2014 are now dying on the battlefield, celebrated as heroes in Russian propaganda. One such case is 16-year-old Illia Moskvitin, a Youth Army member from occupied Donetsk, who was killed by a landmine in 2022. Others, like Ivan Shifman and Dmytro Kotov, joined Russian forces after years of ideological grooming.

[...]

• Dmytro Kotov: In 2015, he graduated from Gymnasium №6 in Dzhankoi, temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia later sent him to Yunarmiya, according to open-source data. After completing his studies at the Sevastopol State Technical University, Kotov signed a contract with the Russian military and served aboard the large landing ship Novocherkassk, part of the 197th Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. Dmytro died on March 24, 2022, while participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

• Illia Moskvitin was also a member of the Yunarmiya unit operating in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region. Illia died on April 14, 2022, before even reaching the age of 16, after stepping on a Lepestok anti-personnel mine, according to materials published by the Yunarmiya organization.

• Ivan Shifman, a student at School №1 in the city of Kalmiuske in the Donetsk region, joined Yunarmiya in 2019. After turning 18, he enlisted in the so-called “People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic” and began serving in Russia’s 1st Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ivan took part in combat operations in several towns across the Donetsk region, including Starohnativka, Hranitne, Malyi Yanisol, Zaitseve, and Rozivka. Ivan was killed in action near the village of Novobakhmutivka along the front line in Donetsk on April 14, 2022—the same day as Illia.

[...]

** What needs to be done to prevent it**

The evidence gathered in this article barely touches the surface of this issue, but it shows how Russia’s child abductions are a systemic state policy.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in the deportations, an act that constitutes a war crime under international law.

Both are suspected of committing the war crime of unlawfully deporting children from occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia—an operation the court says has been underway since at least February 24, 2022.

A historic moment in international law unfolded in Strasbourg on June 25, 2025, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset formally launched the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine, established in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38491622

[...]

Many [Ukrainian] children were moved to Russian territories under the guise of vacation, education, or medical care. Some were placed in camps posing as integration programs, others were adopted into Russian families, stripped of their identities, and reissued new documents. In Russian schools, they’re banned from speaking Ukrainian, exposed to propaganda, and often recruited into the Youth Army.

This policy dates back to 2014, after Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but has intensified. Many of the children taken were not orphans, despite Russian claims. Most had living parents or relatives. Some were institutionalized, others were seized after parents were detained or separated.

[...]

Anatolii’s [not his real name] story is one of many such stories that fortunately ended with Save Ukraine being able to bring him back.

At 17, he was taken straight from school by Russian forces. A week before his 18th birthday, Anatolii was handed a conscription notice from the Russian army—with no real choice but to serve [...] Anatolii stayed behind in a southern Ukrainian town after his brother fled.

He became a target after he and his brother found two boxes of ammunition in a forest and threw them away. FSB agents later detained and beat him, demanding the weapons and names of Ukrainian soldiers. One day, they dragged him from the principal’s office, tied him up, put a bag over his head, and took him to be tortured.

“They broke my rib and shoulder joint, smashed my face, gave me lots of bruises… They said: ‘If we find anything on your phone—you won’t live.'”

At school, Anatolii was taught to shoot and handle explosives. Russians offered him trips to military camps, but he kept refusing.

[...]

In Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the Kremlin is waging a long-term campaign to erase Ukrainian identity and reshape the next generation into loyal subjects of the Russian state. Central to this effort is the militarization of children through schools, propaganda, and paramilitary training.

In classrooms, Ukrainian curricula are being replaced with Russian textbooks. The language, culture, and history of Ukraine are banned or distorted. Weekly indoctrination sessions known as “Conversations About the Important” push pro-Kremlin narratives and glorify military service. Children are taught to view Ukraine and the West as enemies.

[...]

Recruitment into these programs doesn’t focus on academic performance or discipline. Instead, students with aggressive behavior, bullying records, or emotional instability are often targeted, pointing to a disturbing strategy to raise a generation predisposed to violence and deeply indoctrinated with hostility toward NATO and the United States.

[...]

In 2016, Russia’s Defense Ministry launched a youth “military-patriotic” organization called Yunarmiya, or in English, Young Army. In reality, it’s a militarized movement that instills the ideology of Russian aggression and grooms future soldiers for the occupying regime.

Children as young as eight are enrolled. They’re made to swear an oath of loyalty to Russia, promise to “defend its interests,” and embrace “great patriotism.” After that, they undergo firearms and tactical training, learn to operate drones, and more.

Ashley Jordana, Hala Systems’ Director of Law, Policy and Human Rights, said Hala’s assessment, based on geolocation data from mobile phones traced to Yunarmiya bases and testimonies from survivors, suggests cadets are roused daily at 6 am. After a canteen breakfast of eggs and oatmeal, they attend classes in firearms assembly, mine clearance, and military tactics.

[...]

In Crimea, occupied since 2014, Russian authorities dismantled Ukrainian education and launched programs like The Train of Hope to assimilate children. The programme is a Russian state-run initiative launched in occupied Crimea that facilitates the adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Monuments to Russian weapons designers were erected on school grounds, and a 2014 doctrine officially linked education to military preparation.

[...]

Some of the children indoctrinated after 2014 are now dying on the battlefield, celebrated as heroes in Russian propaganda. One such case is 16-year-old Illia Moskvitin, a Youth Army member from occupied Donetsk, who was killed by a landmine in 2022. Others, like Ivan Shifman and Dmytro Kotov, joined Russian forces after years of ideological grooming.

[...]

• Dmytro Kotov: In 2015, he graduated from Gymnasium №6 in Dzhankoi, temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia later sent him to Yunarmiya, according to open-source data. After completing his studies at the Sevastopol State Technical University, Kotov signed a contract with the Russian military and served aboard the large landing ship Novocherkassk, part of the 197th Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. Dmytro died on March 24, 2022, while participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

• Illia Moskvitin was also a member of the Yunarmiya unit operating in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region. Illia died on April 14, 2022, before even reaching the age of 16, after stepping on a Lepestok anti-personnel mine, according to materials published by the Yunarmiya organization.

• Ivan Shifman, a student at School №1 in the city of Kalmiuske in the Donetsk region, joined Yunarmiya in 2019. After turning 18, he enlisted in the so-called “People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic” and began serving in Russia’s 1st Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ivan took part in combat operations in several towns across the Donetsk region, including Starohnativka, Hranitne, Malyi Yanisol, Zaitseve, and Rozivka. Ivan was killed in action near the village of Novobakhmutivka along the front line in Donetsk on April 14, 2022—the same day as Illia.

[...]

** What needs to be done to prevent it**

The evidence gathered in this article barely touches the surface of this issue, but it shows how Russia’s child abductions are a systemic state policy.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in the deportations, an act that constitutes a war crime under international law.

Both are suspected of committing the war crime of unlawfully deporting children from occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia—an operation the court says has been underway since at least February 24, 2022.

A historic moment in international law unfolded in Strasbourg on June 25, 2025, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset formally launched the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine, established in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

[...]

[...]

Many [Ukrainian] children were moved to Russian territories under the guise of vacation, education, or medical care. Some were placed in camps posing as integration programs, others were adopted into Russian families, stripped of their identities, and reissued new documents. In Russian schools, they’re banned from speaking Ukrainian, exposed to propaganda, and often recruited into the Youth Army.

This policy dates back to 2014, after Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but has intensified. Many of the children taken were not orphans, despite Russian claims. Most had living parents or relatives. Some were institutionalized, others were seized after parents were detained or separated.

[...]

Anatolii’s [not his real name] story is one of many such stories that fortunately ended with Save Ukraine being able to bring him back.

At 17, he was taken straight from school by Russian forces. A week before his 18th birthday, Anatolii was handed a conscription notice from the Russian army—with no real choice but to serve [...] Anatolii stayed behind in a southern Ukrainian town after his brother fled.

He became a target after he and his brother found two boxes of ammunition in a forest and threw them away. FSB agents later detained and beat him, demanding the weapons and names of Ukrainian soldiers. One day, they dragged him from the principal’s office, tied him up, put a bag over his head, and took him to be tortured.

“They broke my rib and shoulder joint, smashed my face, gave me lots of bruises… They said: ‘If we find anything on your phone—you won’t live.'”

At school, Anatolii was taught to shoot and handle explosives. Russians offered him trips to military camps, but he kept refusing.

[...]

In Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the Kremlin is waging a long-term campaign to erase Ukrainian identity and reshape the next generation into loyal subjects of the Russian state. Central to this effort is the militarization of children through schools, propaganda, and paramilitary training.

In classrooms, Ukrainian curricula are being replaced with Russian textbooks. The language, culture, and history of Ukraine are banned or distorted. Weekly indoctrination sessions known as “Conversations About the Important” push pro-Kremlin narratives and glorify military service. Children are taught to view Ukraine and the West as enemies.

[...]

Recruitment into these programs doesn’t focus on academic performance or discipline. Instead, students with aggressive behavior, bullying records, or emotional instability are often targeted, pointing to a disturbing strategy to raise a generation predisposed to violence and deeply indoctrinated with hostility toward NATO and the United States.

[...]

In 2016, Russia’s Defense Ministry launched a youth “military-patriotic” organization called Yunarmiya, or in English, Young Army. In reality, it’s a militarized movement that instills the ideology of Russian aggression and grooms future soldiers for the occupying regime.

Children as young as eight are enrolled. They’re made to swear an oath of loyalty to Russia, promise to “defend its interests,” and embrace “great patriotism.” After that, they undergo firearms and tactical training, learn to operate drones, and more.

Ashley Jordana, Hala Systems’ Director of Law, Policy and Human Rights, said Hala’s assessment, based on geolocation data from mobile phones traced to Yunarmiya bases and testimonies from survivors, suggests cadets are roused daily at 6 am. After a canteen breakfast of eggs and oatmeal, they attend classes in firearms assembly, mine clearance, and military tactics.

[...]

In Crimea, occupied since 2014, Russian authorities dismantled Ukrainian education and launched programs like The Train of Hope to assimilate children. The programme is a Russian state-run initiative launched in occupied Crimea that facilitates the adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Monuments to Russian weapons designers were erected on school grounds, and a 2014 doctrine officially linked education to military preparation.

[...]

Some of the children indoctrinated after 2014 are now dying on the battlefield, celebrated as heroes in Russian propaganda. One such case is 16-year-old Illia Moskvitin, a Youth Army member from occupied Donetsk, who was killed by a landmine in 2022. Others, like Ivan Shifman and Dmytro Kotov, joined Russian forces after years of ideological grooming.

[...]

• Dmytro Kotov: In 2015, he graduated from Gymnasium №6 in Dzhankoi, temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia later sent him to Yunarmiya, according to open-source data. After completing his studies at the Sevastopol State Technical University, Kotov signed a contract with the Russian military and served aboard the large landing ship Novocherkassk, part of the 197th Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. Dmytro died on March 24, 2022, while participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

• Illia Moskvitin was also a member of the Yunarmiya unit operating in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region. Illia died on April 14, 2022, before even reaching the age of 16, after stepping on a Lepestok anti-personnel mine, according to materials published by the Yunarmiya organization.

• Ivan Shifman, a student at School №1 in the city of Kalmiuske in the Donetsk region, joined Yunarmiya in 2019. After turning 18, he enlisted in the so-called “People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic” and began serving in Russia’s 1st Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ivan took part in combat operations in several towns across the Donetsk region, including Starohnativka, Hranitne, Malyi Yanisol, Zaitseve, and Rozivka. Ivan was killed in action near the village of Novobakhmutivka along the front line in Donetsk on April 14, 2022—the same day as Illia.

[...]

** What needs to be done to prevent it**

The evidence gathered in this article barely touches the surface of this issue, but it shows how Russia’s child abductions are a systemic state policy.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in the deportations, an act that constitutes a war crime under international law.

Both are suspected of committing the war crime of unlawfully deporting children from occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia—an operation the court says has been underway since at least February 24, 2022.

A historic moment in international law unfolded in Strasbourg on June 25, 2025, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset formally launched the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine, established in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38491042

As Beijing prepares for its grand September 3rd military parade, a pageant meant to project might across the Taiwan Strait, troubling cracks are appearing beneath the polished boots and synchronized salutes. A rising wave of defiance among China’s youth is testing not only the mettle of its armed forces but also the ideological grip of the Communist Party itself.

The announcement of the parade, made by the State Council Information Office on June 28th, was meant to remind the world of China’s growing military prowess. But just days later, that carefully curated image was shaken by a bold act of resistance. In early July, Chinese state media reported that a young man from Guilin had been severely punished for refusing compulsory military service after enlisting in March 2025.

A 2004-born college student nearing graduation reportedly struggled to adapt to the military’s rigid conditions and sought to withdraw from service multiple times. Authorities, however, responded with severe penalties—expelling him and imposing restrictions on employment, financial access, and overseas travel. He also faces a hefty fine of over ¥37,000, signalling zero tolerance for voluntary exit.

Recent conscription refusals in China appear far from isolated. A former legislative official now in exile claims over 200 similar cases occurred in Inner Mongolia alone, along with provinces like Shandong, Hubei, and Fujian recording widespread resistance. Analysts link this trend to a deeper disillusionment: a clash between rigid military expectations and a generation nurtured in comfort and digital independence, increasingly skeptical of the state’s legitimacy and unwilling to endure harsh regimentation for questionable nationalist aims.

[...]

Yet the most unsettling revelation for Beijing may not be the acts of defiance themselves, but the ideological shift they represent. A growing segment of Chinese youth no longer sees military service as patriotic duty. Instead, they see it as complicity in a regime they no longer trust.

This is a generation refusing to be cannon fodder for a party agenda they didn’t vote for. Metaphors of exploited “chives”cut down over and overreflect a rising cynicism about state authority. Increasingly, the refusal to serve is not just an act of fear, but a form of protest.

[...]

Faced with growing dissent, China is turning to pre-emptive indoctrination. The South China Morning Post reports expanded military education initiatives targeting university students and even kindergarteners. Drone piloting, combat simulations, and battlefield immersion experiences are becoming routine tools to engineer loyalty early. The People’s Liberation Army, rather than inspiring voluntary service, appears bent on manufacturing obedience.

Parallel legal efforts are underway too. A director of the National People’s Congress Legal Affairs Commission, has been spearheading reforms to deepen national defense education, an apparent euphemism for embedding patriotism under the skin.

In his closing remarks, the whistle blower offered a stark warning. In the event of war over Taiwan, he predicted, those conscripted unwillingly would not fight with loyalty but with survival instinct. A disengaged soldier, he says, doesn’t charge into fire, he looks for the nearest exit.

He urges parents across China to act while there is still time. “Do not let your children die for a dictator,” he pleaded. He paints a grim picture of what conscription might soon resemble: youth rounded up in the streets, punished mercilessly, even executed if they resist. His advice is chillingly pragmatic — secure passports, plan exits. Prepare for a future where refusal may be the greatest act of courage.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38491042

As Beijing prepares for its grand September 3rd military parade, a pageant meant to project might across the Taiwan Strait, troubling cracks are appearing beneath the polished boots and synchronized salutes. A rising wave of defiance among China’s youth is testing not only the mettle of its armed forces but also the ideological grip of the Communist Party itself.

The announcement of the parade, made by the State Council Information Office on June 28th, was meant to remind the world of China’s growing military prowess. But just days later, that carefully curated image was shaken by a bold act of resistance. In early July, Chinese state media reported that a young man from Guilin had been severely punished for refusing compulsory military service after enlisting in March 2025.

A 2004-born college student nearing graduation reportedly struggled to adapt to the military’s rigid conditions and sought to withdraw from service multiple times. Authorities, however, responded with severe penalties—expelling him and imposing restrictions on employment, financial access, and overseas travel. He also faces a hefty fine of over ¥37,000, signalling zero tolerance for voluntary exit.

Recent conscription refusals in China appear far from isolated. A former legislative official now in exile claims over 200 similar cases occurred in Inner Mongolia alone, along with provinces like Shandong, Hubei, and Fujian recording widespread resistance. Analysts link this trend to a deeper disillusionment: a clash between rigid military expectations and a generation nurtured in comfort and digital independence, increasingly skeptical of the state’s legitimacy and unwilling to endure harsh regimentation for questionable nationalist aims.

[...]

Yet the most unsettling revelation for Beijing may not be the acts of defiance themselves, but the ideological shift they represent. A growing segment of Chinese youth no longer sees military service as patriotic duty. Instead, they see it as complicity in a regime they no longer trust.

This is a generation refusing to be cannon fodder for a party agenda they didn’t vote for. Metaphors of exploited “chives”cut down over and overreflect a rising cynicism about state authority. Increasingly, the refusal to serve is not just an act of fear, but a form of protest.

[...]

Faced with growing dissent, China is turning to pre-emptive indoctrination. The South China Morning Post reports expanded military education initiatives targeting university students and even kindergarteners. Drone piloting, combat simulations, and battlefield immersion experiences are becoming routine tools to engineer loyalty early. The People’s Liberation Army, rather than inspiring voluntary service, appears bent on manufacturing obedience.

Parallel legal efforts are underway too. A director of the National People’s Congress Legal Affairs Commission, has been spearheading reforms to deepen national defense education, an apparent euphemism for embedding patriotism under the skin.

In his closing remarks, the whistle blower offered a stark warning. In the event of war over Taiwan, he predicted, those conscripted unwillingly would not fight with loyalty but with survival instinct. A disengaged soldier, he says, doesn’t charge into fire, he looks for the nearest exit.

He urges parents across China to act while there is still time. “Do not let your children die for a dictator,” he pleaded. He paints a grim picture of what conscription might soon resemble: youth rounded up in the streets, punished mercilessly, even executed if they resist. His advice is chillingly pragmatic — secure passports, plan exits. Prepare for a future where refusal may be the greatest act of courage.

[...]