Assuming we don't have free will, why do we have the illusion that we do? (slrpnk.net)

submitted 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) by frankPodmore@slrpnk.net to c/asklemmy@lemmy.world

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Three possibilities come to mind:

Is there an evolutionary purpose?

Does it arise as a consequence of our mental activities, a sort of side effect of our thinking?

Is it given a priori (something we have to think in order to think at all)?

EDIT: Thanks for all the responses! Just one thing I saw come up a few times I'd like to address: a lot of people are asking 'Why assume this?' The answer is: it's purely rhetorical! That said, I'm happy with a well thought-out 'I dispute the premiss' answer.

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[-] tal@lemmy.today 2 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago)

After all, I don’t ascribe my heartbeat to an external force, but I am aware that I don’t will it.

No, but you have the ability to sense your heartbeat, so you can tell that it's there.

You don't have the ability to sense electromagnetic emissions in the X-ray frequency range, so you can't tell that they're there. You wouldn't know if X-rays of a given intensity were present at a given moment. It's like asking "why is there the illusion that there are no X-rays" when you wouldn't expect to feel differently regardless of their presence or non-presence.

[-] frankPodmore@slrpnk.net 1 points 4 months ago

But my body also takes actions which I don't control and of which I'm not conscious. E.g., normal cell death and replacement (granted, I would eventually notice if this stopped, but not in the short term). I don't have the illusion of control over those actions, but I do have a sense (real or not) of control over others. My question is, why do I have that sense if it's not real?

The premiss involves the idea that it would feel different, that my deliberate acts would feel (like cell replacement) like a thing that happens, rather than a thing I'm doing. Granted, if I were unconscious of all my acts, it wouldn't feel like anything (like my experience of x-rays, which is a non-experience), but then I would be unconscious. So, if I'm interpreting you correctly, are you suggesting that the sense of will is a property of consciousness, and that consciousness is itself an emergent property of sensory experience?

this post was submitted on 08 Jul 2024

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