unhrpetby

joined 4 months ago
[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 7 points 10 hours ago* (last edited 10 hours ago) (1 children)

...saying what newsom or allred said.

I don't know about allred, but if this is the Gavin Newsom statement you're referring to:

I think it’s an issue of fairness, I completely agree with you on that. It is an issue of fairness — it’s deeply unfair...

Then I don't understand how it goes from that to:

...cheering on as trans people are murdered in camps...

[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 2 points 1 week ago

Different variation of the Sorites Paradox.

[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 15 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

I am very intelligent.

[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 13 points 2 weeks ago (9 children)
  1. Tradition.
  2. Belief that work-from-home is less efficient.
[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 4 points 2 weeks ago

...that proved that the algorithms/protocols work.

You can use a perfect algorithm and still be insecure because the implementation was bad. You are trusting the SimpleX Chat devs to a degree.

[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 4 points 2 weeks ago

I wouldn't trust encryption made by anti-vaxer more than...

Important to note: SimpleX Chat has gone through two security audits.

[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 5 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) (1 children)

The SimpleX Chat is AGPL. If the founder is problematic, one can fork it and avoid reinventing what has already been made.

[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 2 points 2 weeks ago

It is forkable if necessary. I do think SimpleX is a great piece of software that shouldn't be reinvented because of the founder.

[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 2 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

There was this recent attack to XZ utils, which shows that more attention is needed on the code being merged and compiled.

XZ was made possible largely because there was unaudited binary data. One part as test data in the repo, and the other part within the pre-built releases. Bootstrapping everything from source would have required that these binaries had an auditable source, thus allowing public eyes to review the code and likely stopping the attack. Granted, reproducibility almost certainly would have too, unless the malware wasn't directly present in the code.

Pulled from here:

Every unauditable binary also leaves us vulnerable to compiler backdoors as described by Ken Thompson in the 1984 paper Reflections on Trusting Trust and beautifully explained by Carl Dong in his Bitcoin Build System Security talk.

It is therefore equally important that we continue towards our final goal: A Full Source bootstrap; removing all unauditable binary seeds.

Sure you might have the code that was input into GCC to create the binary, and sure the code can be absolutely safe, and you can even compile it yourself to see that you arrive at the same bit-for-bit binary as the official release binary. But was GCC safe? Did some other compilation dependency infect the compiled binary? Bootstrapping from an auditable seed can answer this question.

[–] unhrpetby@sh.itjust.works 0 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

...has a message for protesters in Brevard County...

You mean the "kill" message is for protesters who:

...throw a brick, a firebomb, or point a gun at one of our deputies...

 

Helix is great, but please why can't indentation just be what is set in the language.toml file?

[[language]]
name = "zig"
indent = { tab-width = 8, unit = "\t" }

Changing indent-heuristic doesn't fix it. Why does helix give me the option to set the indentation style and then proceed to overwrite it, Instantly resetting it to 4 spaces instead of what I told it.

The behavior that is occurring is extremely weird and would be instantaneously solved if helix would just use the value in the file.

I don't want your garbage heuristic, I just want you to leave my file alone and do what I told you.

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